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MOTHERHOOD AND CONTRACT:
ALWAYS CRASHING IN THE SAME CAR'
ELISE BRUHL2
The paradigms of contract and mother are undoubtedly at
odds.3 Contract, in its most elemental legal guise, is at once a
legally enforceable agreement and the product of a negotiated
transaction. Put another way, the parties involved in a given
contract are "arm's-length transactors," understood to have
bargained for whatever object or service a given contract will
provide.4 By standing at arm's length, the transactors are able to
reach some optimal, mutually satisfactory result. This paradigm is,
of course, an ideal within the law; nevertheless, it forms the basis
for contractual interaction and analysis.5 Still, the ideal's
pervasiveness has shown most clearly in the ways it has been
reproduced outside of legal discourse. It appears not only in
fundamental economic textbooks, but also in guides to negotiating
1DAVID BOWIE, Low ( RCA Records 1977).
2 Lecturer, College of General Studies, University of Pennsylvania.
3 As Adrienne Rich and others have noted, a woman's experience of motherhood
diverges from the institution of motherhood. See, e.g., ADRIENNE RICH, OF
WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION, (1976); see
also ANNE FINGER, PAST DUE: A STORY OF DISABILITY, PREGNANCY, AND
BIRTH 169-72 (The Women's Press Ltd. 1990). However, the paradigm of
motherhood is always embodied in the mother. Even the gender neutral
"parenting" or the gestures made by various authors that nurturing can be done
by both sexes often imply (or use) the word "mother." See, e.g., JUuA GRANT,
RAISING BABY BY THE BOOK: THE EDUCATION OF AMERICAN MOTHERS 3-10
(1998); ALICE MILLER, THE DRAMA OF BEING A CHILD at 34-39, 54-56, 74-75,
125-27 (1995).
4 See FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, §1.2, 5. (3d ed. 1997) 7; ANDERSON ON THE
UCC, §1-102:286, 192-93. (3d ed. 1981-90).
5 See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 4, at §1.2; see also CORBIN ON CONTRACTS,
§1.
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and even in works that focus on education, diet, and
sadomasochism.
6
However ubiquitous it may be in its current manifestations,
however, this ideal of the arm's-length transactor finds itself
fundamentally at odds with the equally pervasive ideal of a
"mother," the ultimate caretaker who never renounces the
obligations that motherhood brings. 7 Part of this opposition arises
out of the various dichotomies that demarcate a mother's identity
and domain, the irony here being that what is presented as
fundamentally natural and historically transcendent has itself been
radically transformed over the past two and half centuries. As
Thomas Lacqueur and others have demonstrated convincingly, late
eighteenth-century idealizations of motherhood brought with them
a number of accompanying assumptions about the nature of
domesticity, defining it as a resolutely private space free from the
economic concerns of its public counterpart. 8 Such an elegant
partitioning of gendered space suggests as much about the mutual
dependence of motherhood and modern economic theory as it does
about Enlightenment ideals of symmetry. Placed squarely within
6 See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUs, ECONOMICS 3-5,
80-85, 265-68 (1998); CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL & STANLEY R. BRUE,
ECONOMICS 10-11 (1996); ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF
CONFLICT 2-5 (1991); see also PAT CALIFIA, MACHO SLUTS 10-27 (Alyson
Publications 1988); ELLEN FEIN & SHERRIE SCHNEIDER, THE RULES: TIME
TESTED SECRETS FOR CAPTURING THE HEART OF MR. RIGHT (1995); BARRY
SEARS, ENTER THE ZONE: A DIETARY ROAD MAP 1-8, 35-85 (1995); THEODORE
R. SIZER & NANCY F. SIZER, THE STUDENTS ARE WATCHING: SCHOOLS AND THE
MORAL CONTRACT, (1999). For an idiosyncratic vision of contract, see KATHY
O'DELL, CONTRACT WITH THE SKIN: MASOCHISM, PERFORMANCE ART, AND THE
1970s 3-17 (1995).7See, e.g., Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle For
Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1416, 1451-63 (1991).
8 See LEONORE DAVIDOFF & CATHERINE HALL, FAMILY FORTUNES: MEN &
WOMEN OF THE ENGLISH MIDDLE CLASS 1780-1850 149-92 (1987); THOMAS
LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM THE GREEKS TO FREUD 194-
207 (1990); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 1-3 (2000); CAROL SHINER WILSON,
LOST NEEDLES, AND THE ARTISTIC ENTERPRISE IN BARBAULD; EDGEWORTH,




this domestic space--and at a time when American and Scottish
political economists were redefining a public sphere characterized
by the contradictions of individual self-interest producing public
good--mothers became defined by their innate lack of self-interest.
Motherly selflessness, furthermore, derived much of its force from
the biology of childbirth, breast-feeding, and early childcare,
rendering it all but inaccessible to men and childless women.9 The
paradoxes attending its formulation, when opposed to those of the
equally "natural" arm's length contractor, are worth noting, since
motherly selflessness in the public world would prove as
"unnatural" as selfish negotiation in the private. Even more
striking, however, are the assumptions at work in contractual and
motherly ideals concerning "distance"--since arms-length
transactors, by definition, must remain distant from the other
person bargaining, while representations of motherly experience
often idealize the closeness and connection between mother and
child.' °
Yet, despite these paradigmatic differences, the concepts of
arm's length transactor and mother are far from exclusive in
practice. Modern households are strikingly economic entities, and
it is no accident that the word "domestic" emerges in the eighteenth
century usually attached to the word "economy."" However rarely
9 See LAQUEUR, supra note 8, at 200-207; JOAN WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 1-3.
For a discussion of a more recent evocation of these distinctions and the tensions
that they can produce, see SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARDS A
POLITICS OF PEACE 28-30 (1989)..
1o See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 2-3,
20-26 (1988); see also PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGHTS 225-27 (1991). The arm's length transactor and the rational "economic
man" have met with ample criticism for not being sufficiently contextualized.
See, e.g., NANCY FOLBRE, WHO PAYS FOR THE KIDS? GENDER AND THE
STRUCTURES OF CONSTRAINT 1-10, 16-28 (1994); NANCY C.M. HARTSOCK,
MONEY, SEX, AND POWER: TOWARD A FEMINIST HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 39-
41 (1983); MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 1-15, 164-72
(1996). For further discussion, see Ian R. MacNeil, Efficient Breach of Contract:
Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947, 948-52 (1982); Ian R. MacNeil,
Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a
"Rich Classificatory Apparatus," 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1018, 1019-27 (1981).
" See, e.g., THE LADIES' LIBRARY; OR, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FEMALE KNOWLEDGE,
IN EVERY BRANCH OF DOMESTIC ECONOMY: COMPREHENDING, IN
2000-2001
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we might see "motherly" and "economy" coupled either then or
now, women still regularly contract for services usually designated
as tasks for mothers to perform. 12 Women contract to take care of
ALPHABETICAL ARRANGEMENT, DISTINCT TREATISES ON EVERY PRACTICAL
SUBJECT, NECESSARY FOR SERVANTS AND MISTRESSES OF FAMILIES. I. A MOST
EXTENSIVE SYSTEM OF COOKERY. II. A COMPLETE BODY OF DOMESTIC
MEDICINE. III. THE PRESERVATION OF BEAUTY, AND PREVENTION OF
DEFORMITY, IN WHICH IS INCLUDED A VAST FUND OF MISCELLANEOUS
INFORMATION, OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE IN DOMESTIC LIFE, IN TWO
VOLUMES, (London, Printed for J. Ridgway, No, I, York Street, St. James
Square. 1790). This genre continued into the nineteenth century, through a series
of works that were intended to help a woman manage her household: kitchen,
servants, accounts, and health and education of children. See, e.g., DOMESTIC
ECONOMY, AND COOKERY, FOR RICH AND POOR; CONTAINING AN ACCOUNT OF
THE BEST ENGLISH, SCOTCH, FRENCH, ORIENTAL, AND OTHER FOREIGN DISHES,
PREPARATIONS OF BROTHS AND MILKS FOR CONSUMPTION; RECEIPTS FOR SEA-
FARING MEN, TRAVELLERS, AND CHILDREN'S FOOD, TOGETHER WITH ESTIMATES
AND COMPARISONS OF DINNERS AND DISHES, THE WHOLE COMPOSED WITH THE
UTMOST ATTENTION TO HEALTH, ECONOMY, AND ELEGANCE, BY A LADY. 1-10,
60-101 (London, Printed for Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green,
Paternoster-Row, 1827); JOHN EDWARD WATSON, THE HOUSEWIFE'S
DIRECTORY: BEING THE MOST COMPLETE SYSTEM OF DOMESTIC ECONOMY
EVER SUBMITTED TO PUBLIC NOTICE v-vi (London, Printed for William Cole, No
10, Newgate Street, 1825). Attempts to develop domestic "economy" as a field
of academic study continued throughout the nineteenth century as well,
occasionally as a recuperative attempt at achieving women's equality without the
vote. See, e.g., CATHARINE E. BEECHER, A TREATISE ON DOMESTIC ECONOMY,
FOR THE USE OF YOUNG LADIES AT HOME AND AT SCHOOL, 5-7, 49-68 (revised
ed., Harper & Bros., New York, 1846); CATHARINE E. BEECHER, HARRIET
BEECHER STOWE, THE AMERICAN WOMEN'S HOME, OR PRINCIPLES OF
DOMESTIC SCIENCE, BEING A GUIDE TO THE FORMATION AND MAINTENANCE OF
ECONOMICAL, BEAUTIFUL, HEALTHFUL, AND CHRISTIAN HOMES, 15, 17, 20-21,
463-67 (J.R. Ford & Co., New York, 1869); CATHARINE E. BEECHER, THE TRUE
REMEDY FOR THE WRONGS OF WOMAN, WITH A HISTORY OF AN ENTERPRISE
HAVING THAT FOR ITS OBJECT 5-29, 39-40 (Phillips, Sampson, & Co., Boston,
1851); CATHARINE E. BEECHER, WOMAN'S PROFESSION AS MOTHER AND
EDUCATOR, WITH VIEWS IN OPPOSITION TO WOMAN SUFFRAGE i-ii (Dedication),
5-6 (New York, Maclean, Gibson, & Co., 1872). Although Beecher recommends
her approach to domestic economy and training (and remunerative employ for
women) as a means for women to achieve a greater measure of economic
security and a more stable home life, she also recommends that boys be taught
some domestic skills as a means of aiding their wives and families, if not
supplanting them. See REMEDY at 51-60; DOMESTIC ECONOMY at 163-64.
12 In making this statement, I also recognize that men are capable of performing
194 VOL. IX
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other women's children and to do the household tasks designated as
another "mother's" responsibilities. 13 They even act as surrogates,
bearing children in other women's stead. 14 These "maternal
these same services; that primary male caretakers exist; and that men also have
nurturing capacities. However, the fact that such tasks are done by men
intermittently, or rarely, does not negate the fact that these tasks are nevertheless
designated women's, particularly a mother's, responsibilities. See ARLIE
RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND
HOME BECOMES WORK, 38-44, 115-33 (1997); Barbara Ehrenreich, Maid to
Order: The Politics of Other Women's Work, HARPERS, April 2000, at 59-60.
Czapanskiy's metaphor of "volunteers" and "draftees" is useful as a conceptual
starting point for an understanding of the contrast between a woman's and a
man's experience of contracting to perform these tasks. See Czapanskiy supra
note 7. A man can perform these services, if he in fact chooses to do so; he can
choose to deviate from an assigned status as a father to engage in caretaking, but
that same sense of choosing to do so rather than having to do so makes the
quality of this process somewhat different. To use the language of contract once
again, a man can walk away from the transaction or up the ante of the bargain; a
woman may transfer responsibility to another caretaker but cannot, as it were,
move away from the table. A woman contracts to shift some of the burden
imposed upon her at all times, a man chooses time, place, and setting.
13 See, e.g,, ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT 6-7 (1989). Some scholars
have referred to the work that women do, whether for their own families or for
others, as "motherwork." See Patricia Hill Collins, Shifting the Center: Race,
Class and Feminist Theorizing about Motherhood, in DONNA BASSIN,
MARGARET HONEY, AND MERYL MAHRER KAPLAN, REPRESENTATIONS OF
MOTHERHOOD 59-62, 72-73 (1994); Sarah Ruddick, Thinking
Mothers/Conceiving Birth, in REPRESENTATIONS OF MOTHERHOOD, at 33-35.
Cf. Julia A. Hanigsberg, Homologizing Pregnancy and Motherhood: A
Consideration of Abortion, 94 MICH. L. REV. 371, 374 (1995) (utilizing term).
Ruddick does draw a distinction between "birthgiving" and "motherwork" as a
means of envisioning a range of familial arrangements and possibilities for
caretaking. See Ruddick, Thinking Mothers, at 36-39. For some recent
discussions of questions of reinventing familial arrangements and subsidy of
caretaking, see e.g.,, Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational
Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER Soc.
POLY & L. 13 (2000); Twila L. Perry, Caretakers, Entitlement, and Diversity, 8
AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC., POL'Y & L 153 (2000); Catherine J. Ross & Naomi R.
Cahn, Subsidy for Caretaking in Families: Lessons from Foster Care, 8 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 55 (2000); see also MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN,
THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH
CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
14 Of course, surrogacy and adoption contracts have been and continue to be
contested. See infra notes 59-71 and accompanying text.
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contracts" occur frequently and have a lengthy history. 15 As might
be suspected, they also inevitably come with vocal detractors, who
insist that motherhood must remain separate from the experience of
contracting for such services or, indeed, from any sort of contract
at all.
16
One concern often raised, for example, is the threat of
overreaching and coercion, particularly for women who become
surrogates. Confronting the issue of whether surrogacy contracts
are enforceable, Martha Field and Elizabeth Anderson have argued
that these contracts cannot be anything other than unconscionable,
1S The same treatises that involve "domestic economy" also involve, in large
part, the management of the various contracts that the lady of the house would
enter into, as employer of servants, housekeeper, and amateur physician. See
supra note 11. The discussions of childrearing would also involve discussions
about how best to avoid nursery maids who would drug or otherwise mistreat
children. See id. The histories of women who have been hired for domestic
labor, particular women of color, have also been widely discussed. See, e.g,.
W.E.B. Du Bois, THE PHILADELPHIA NEGRO: A SOCIAL STUDY, WITH A NEW
INTRODUCTION BY ELIAH ANDERSON, TOGETHER WITH A SPECIAL REPORT ON
DOMESTIC SERVICE BY ISABEL EATON (1996); ELIZABETH R. HAYNES, UNSUNG
HEROES, THE BLACK BOY OF ATLANTA, NEGROES IN DOMESTIC SERVICE IN THE
UNITED STATES (1997); HOCHSCHILD, SECOND SHIFT, supra note 13, at 4-5,
232-35, 239-47; NICKY GREGSON AND MICHELLE LOWE, SERVICING THE MIDDLE
CLASSES: CLASS, GENDER AND WAGED DOMESTIC LABOUR IN CONTEMPORARY
BRITAIN (1994); PHYLLIS PALMER, DOMESTICITY AND DIRT: HOUSEWIVES AND
DOMESTIC SERVANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1920-45 (1989); Dorothy E.
Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework 9 YALE J. L & FEMINISM 51 (1997);
Ehrenreich, supra note 12 at 60-70.
16 Women who contract out their maternal labor find themselves facing a variety
of hostile responses as well as contradictory messages about the appropriateness
of their work both inside and outside of the home. See FAYE D. GINSBURG &
RAYNA RAPP, CONCEIVING THE NEW WORLD ORDER: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF
PRODUCTION 78-79 (1995); JOAN WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 31-50; see also
Nancy Duff Campbell & Judith C. Applebaum, Here's What U.S. Parents Really
Need, SAN DIEGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 18, 1999, at B-Il, B-9; Cathleen Decker,
Mothers Agree on Many Childcare Issues, Fathers See Things Differently, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, June 13, 1999, at A32; Marilyn Gardner, Search for a Truce in
the Mommy Wars, The CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 5, 1999, at 2; Iris
Krasnow, It's Time to End the 'Mommy Wars," WASHINGTON POST, May 7,
1999, at C5; see also Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the
Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559,1624-32 (1991).
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since they can constitute offers that women simply cannot refuse.17
Similarly, contracts for egg donation, child care, and other forms of
household labor have met with criticism from both ends of the
political spectrum. While social conservatives have usually
attacked such contracts by claiming that women who do so have
selfishly deviated from their true role as mothers, liberal and
progressive thinkers have pointed to the ways in which these
contracts have enabled wealthier women to exploit their poorer
counterparts in the name of achieving greater household equity.'
8
These same criticisms often accompany arguments attacking
transacted labor more generally, so that maternal contracts serve as
emblematic cases of the ways in which contract perpetuates
inequality. 19
Implicit in these positions, of course, are assumptions about
women's special fitness for providing child care; coupled to these
are even more determined beliefs concerning motherhood. If
attackers of maternal contracts express certainty about anything, it
is that the best child care is provided by the mother herself.20 Even
in the face of these criticisms, however, women continue to
contract for child care and other forms of domestic service,
whether as purchasers or providers, and they continue to struggle
with the problems that these contracts bring, emotionally,
"7 See., e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993);
Martha Field, Surrogacy Contracts--Gestational and Traditional: The Argument
for Nonenforcement, 31 WASH. L. J. 1, 5-8 (1991); Gena Corea, The
Reproductive Brothel in GENA COREA ET AL, MAN-MADE WOMEN: How NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AFFECT WOMEN 38-43 (1987) (discussing the
prospect of reproductive brothels, where impoverished and third world women
are made to bear children for little to no money); see also DEBORAH L. RHODE,
JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 224-25 (1989).
18 See Decker, supra note 16; Ehrenreich, supra note 12; Gardner, supra note
16; Joan Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 16.
'9 See, e.g, SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 41-43
(Basic Books 1989); PATRICIA WILUAMS, THE ROOSTER'S EGG: ON THE
PERSISTENCE OF PREJUDICE 170-74 (1995).
20 See Margaret K. Nelson, Family Day Care Providers: Dilemmas of Daily
Practice in EVELYN NAKANO GLENN, GRACE CHANG, LINDA RENNIE-FORCEY,
MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY (1994); GINSBURG & RAPP,
supra note 16; Carol Sanger, Separating From Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
375, 376400 (1996).
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monetarily, and otherwise.2' This essay, then, seeks most
fundamentally to explore the competing ideological demands made
upon women--and the negotiations that result--as they encounter
motherhood and the institutions associated with it: marriage,
pregnancy, childrearing, and domestic labor. In looking to the
nature of these negotiations, I wish to expose how women's
experience of motherhood is marked both by a series of legal
contracts and by agreements that have the cultural force of
contracts, if not their legal effect. I do so to demonstrate the ways
in which women, when subjected to the competing demands of
contract and motherhood, act as they simultaneously are acted
upon, particularly when they attempt not to mother, or not to be
mothers, even for a brief amount of time. Much of my interest in
the relationship between motherhood and contract stems from a
desire to analyze motherhood's power as an ideological construct
and to expose the often contradictory assumptions that characterize
it. In other words, I seek to explore the extent to which contract as
an analytical approach can be brought to bear upon motherhood--to
demonstrate not only motherhood's ideological contradictions but
also the decisions women make when confronted with them.
22
I. The Marriage Contract Revisited
I begin with the marriage contract because it is the primary
contract women negotiate with regard to motherhood and the
legitimacy of her motherhood. Referring to issues of legitimacy
may at first appear archaic. Having a child out of wedlock, after all,
no longer results in equal protection violations for the child or
21 See HOcHSCHILD, TIME BIND, supra note 12, at 1-50.
22 See AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR,
MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998);
PATRICIA WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 15-50,
219-25, for discussions of how contract exacerbates inequality. A number of the
contracts that will be discussed in this essay have not always been enforced in
the courts, such as surrogacy contracts, or are illegal, such as contracts for sex.
However, I wish to examine these contracts (or contract-like arrangements) as a
means by which to examine how women negotiate their relationship to




inevitable social ostracism for both mother and child; yet recent
debates over welfare reform and abortion have confirmed that
unwed mothers and, their children still experience profound
discrimination and social stigma. 23 In such a political and moral
climate, marriage still functions as a powerful legitimizing tool,
and so my aim in beginning here is not only to examine how a
woman legitimates herself through the marriage contract, but also
to interrogate what that contract ultimately entails.
Coverture is no more, and the marriage contract obviously
is not what it used to be. Certainly women are not generally
betrothed as infants through contractual arrangements between
families, nor can dissolution of a marriage be considered as a
broken contract between two men. 24 Even the most cursory
examination of courtship and marriage rituals, however, shows the
degree to which marriage is still characterized by a series of
agreements, some of which are overtly contractual. The most
notorious of these agreements, the prenuptial contract, echoes an
earlier form of negotiation, but here, the paradigm is not one of two
men contracting for a transfer of property but rather of a man and a
23 See Linda C. McClain, Irresponsible Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339
(1996); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional
Conditions and Welfare, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 931 (1995); Carla M. da Luz &
Pamela C. Weckerly, Recent Developments: Will the New Republican Majority
in Congress Wage Old Battles Against Women?, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 501
(1995); see also WILLIAMS, ROOSTER'S EGG, supra note 19, at 2-14 (discussing
the media phenomenon of the "welfare mother").
24 To be sure, adherents and critics of arranged marriage, same-sex marriage, and
marriage itself, are legion. See, e.g., Linda S. Eckols, The Personal and Social
Implications of Same Gender Matrimony, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 353 (1999);
Laurel Remers Parde, The Dilemma of Dowry Deaths: Domestic Disgrace or
International Human Rights Catastrophe?, 13 ARIZ. J. INVL & COMP. L. 491
(1996); Jeffrey Evans Stake & Michael Grossberg, Roundtable: Opportunities
for and Limitations of Private Ordering in Family Law, 73 IND. L. J. 535
(1998); Andrew Koppelman, Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?, 42 AM. J.
JURIS. 51 (1997); see also Christine S.Y. Chun, Comment, The Mail Order Bride
Industry: The Perpetuation of Transnational Economic Inequalities and
Stereotypes, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1155 (1996). However, the paradigm of
"marriage" as a chosen relationship between two people, a man and a woman, is
the paradigm at issue in this essay, and indeed, in other contexts as well. See,
e.g., Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
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woman setting forth, either verbally with one another or in writing,
the terms of their agreement. Such contracts are entered into, of
course, with the knowledge that both parties can end that
relationship, and that the division of assets is set forth prior to
divorce.
These commonplaces mean that dissolving a marriage
contract does not always result in compensation for women.
Although courts will enforce prenuptial agreements, they have
been reluctant to acknowledge contracts for domestic labor or
affection, not only for the overtly contractual rationale of lack of
consideration, but also in the name of such contracts "debasing
marriage."5 Idealizing marriage in this way produces counter-
intuitive results, since such exclusions result in traditional women's
labor receiving no compensation in the event of dissolution of the
marriage agreement. Such judicial language demonstrates two
further tendencies at work here. First, it shows that when
contractual analogies are placed onto the marital contract, women's
labor and their accustomed contribution to a marriage are excluded
from monetary compensation. Second, it strongly suggests through
this exclusion that if women are remunerated for their labor, their
compensation takes forms other than money.
26
Even in situations apart from the formal prenuptial contract,
marriage does not occur without a series of other gestures and
agreements that have legal force. Matters such as licensing, blood
tests, and ceremonies combine to create a marriage. Taking up this
sense of social ritual and linguistic gesture as ultimately legal,
Carole Pateman thus defines the marriage contract as both the
ceremony of marriage and the act of consummation of the
marriage.27 She also notes that marriage is a monolithic and
inescapable contract: married couples cannot choose between
2 See Katharine Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93
Nw. U. L. REV. 65, 78-88 (1998); see also Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow
of Love, The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We Think About
Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 147-162 (1998) (providing history of
enforcement of premarital agreements).
26 See Silbaugh, supra note 25; see also Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into
Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1996).
2 CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT, 162 (1988).
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several contracts when they marry; they can only elect to enter the
marriage contract. Beyond its historical function as an expression
of male sex-right, commentators have argued at length at what the
marriage contract entails, and what its components -- moral, legal,
and ideological -- are, but there appears at least to be a consensus
that the marriage contract is almost wholly unlike other contracts,
and must be analyzed as such.29
Bearing these views in mind, a marriage at first may appear
to be a volitional decision between two people too close at hand to
be at arm's length from one another; nevertheless, two people must
agree to get married and, once married, must create their own
"marriage" as they see fit. As any married couple knows, however,
other conventions also are at work here. Signing a marriage license
and performing other necessary rituals might make one's marriage
legal, but the social conventions surrounding one may very well
enforce, either contractually or seemingly so, a model of marriage
very different from that originally envisioned by the two
participants. These social conventions, in Paternan's sense, are as
central to a "marriage" between two people as the vows they have
made or the documents they have signed.
In other words, the marriage contract is both an individual
and a social contract, since, in asking a community to recognize its
commitment, a pair becomes an embodiment of that community's
idea of what a married couple is. Deviating from such a norm
means threatening to break this agreement to abide by the
boundaries that marriage prescribes. A small amount of
manipulation of these contours might be possible providing both
contractors agree to it (a woman may not agree to "obey" during
the marriage ceremony, for example); and divorce is, at least at this
point in time, a possibility for married couples. Yet, the
2 Id. at 163. For useful overviews of the meanings of marriage, see Bix, supra
note 25, at 162-74; see also Silbaugh, supra note 25, at 111-117.
29 See, e.g., Bix, supra note 25, at 206-07; Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Market: Is there a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L.
REV. 509, 565-593 (1998). But see Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage
as Contract, Opportunistic Violence, and Other Bad Arguments for Fault
Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 719, 737-747 (rejecting contractual approach).
30 PATEMAN, supra note27, at 162-65.
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opportunity to maneuver does not lessen the fact that, especially for
women, getting married and being married is to be subjected to an
array of competing (and contradictory) social conventions in
exchange for certain legal and moral protections. That is the "deal"
that a woman makes, or, in retrospect, finds herself to have made.
Considerable criticism in the last decade has been directed
at modem marriages for their supposed overemphasis on
individuality and contract. These arguments claim that current
marriages are concerned less with commitment than with selfish
individuality, and, as such, harm children and threaten the social
fabric. 3' What these representations show more than anything is
just how odd a social and legal animal marriage is. At once a
linchpin of social mores and of punditry, its status shifts uneasily
between both status and contract. Women may get married for a
variety of reasons, from the personal and emotional to the
economic and social, but once they are married, they achieve the
status of marriage. From this point onward, the law reflects this
status and concerns itself primarily with the nature of the
relationships formed and the maintenance of the commitments
formed if those relationships are severed, i.e., the contractual
underpinnings of marital status once again become apparent with
marriage's dissolution. 32 In other words, marriage is status law, but
contract shapes and informs it.
The contracts resulting in the status of marriage provide
obvious social benefits to women, since, along with the
legitimization of the children born in marriage, the act of sex itself
is given legitimacy.33 As a result, to become a mother without the
31 See MILTON C. REGAN JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURsUIT OF INTIMACY,
176-83 (1993); see also MARGARET BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT To COVENANT,
BEYOND THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 1-14, 18-25, 83-109
(2000); JOHN J. WrrrE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT To CONTRACT: MARRIAGE,
RELIGION, AND LAW IN WESTERN CULTURE (1997). For another set of
viewpoints rejecting a contractual model of marriage on conservative Christian
grounds, see, e.g., Gary L. Bauer, End No-Fault Divorce, USA TODAY, Dec. 29,
1995, at 10A.
32 See, e.g., Bix, supra note 25, at 162-68, 250-5 1.
33 Mary Joe Frug links anti-prostitution laws with the "maternalization" of the
female body and claims that the legitimization of children within the context of
marriage is part of that process of maternalization. In drawing this connection,
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sanction of the marriage contract is to cut against the model of
social interaction and male sexual ownership. Motherhood may be
constituted through a variety of social interactions and constraints,
but actually becoming a mother requires the rather unrelenting and
unexceptional fact of sexual conduct.34 My concern here is not in
spelling out biological niceties, but to note that marriage's
legitimization of the act of sex also means something for women
who have children outside of marriage, since these women who
have children outside of marriage are fulfilling their maternal
function, but they have not contracted to do so.
Acknowledging the presence of contract in marriage, I
contend, makes other contracts become more apparent as well,
both in their form and in their function. This is particularly true of
those contracts that relate to motherhood and the duties that
motherhood imposes. In so stating, I now turn to what a woman
bargains for when she chooses to become pregnant, assuming at the
outset that such a decision is a choice. 5 Given that contract is
superimposed on both marriage and sex (both precursors to
"legitimate" motherhood,36) I find motherhood in its most socially
Frug questions the conduct of a legal system that reduces women's sexual
identities to paradigms of "the mother" or "the prostitute": "[A]nti-prostitution
rules maternalize the female body. They not only interrogate women with the
question of whether they are for or against prostitution; they also raise the
question of whether a woman is for illegal sex or whether she is for legal,
maternalized sex." Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1055 (1992).
3 Even allowing for the use of new reproductive technologies by some
individuals, what might be called the "old fashioned way" still predominates.
35 "Choosing" to become pregnant is a best case scenario. However, if
"choosing" to become pregnant includes a variety of "choices" that one does not
elect to choose, the experience of an unwanted pregnancy only increases the
number of conditions that are placed upon a woman who is also a mother.
36 Cf. RHODE, supra note 17 at 134-40. Their choice, as such, has been to
contract for legally legitimate sex that results in pregnancy (marriage), rather
than to contract with men for sex that may or may not result in pregnancy, a
contract for sex that may have some degree of social acceptance or legal
tolerance but is not legally legitimated (being sexually active), or criminalized
sex (prostitution). The fact that women can enter into "domestic partnerships"
with other women, have sex with other women, or become pregnant through
artificial insemination does not undo the analysis here.
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acceptable form to embody a kind of contradiction in terms--a
noncontractual status that one should contract to enter. This same
status places women in the equally contradictory state of becoming
either "failed" or nontransacting transactors: women must at once
negotiate the duties and expectations motherhood imposes without
appearing :o do so, since the woman who bargains over the "terms"
of motherhood is perceived to be an affront to the institution of
which she is a part. Even the process of becoming pregnant by
choice demands that a woman negotiate her way through a number
of agreements and non-negotiable conditions. Should these choices
result in marriage, they include the presupposed conditions of
becoming a mother. A woman can try to resist this maternal status
that is part of the marital status, but her resistance nevertheless is
defined by the role of motherhood imposed upon her, even if she
chooses not to have children and that role is never realized. 37 In
other words, a woman who is married is presumed to be a mother
regardless of whether she becomes one--a presumption that, in
turn, forces her to assume a status supposedly free from the
logistics of contract and contractual choice.
II. Sexual Contract and Maternal Status
Of course, many women want to be mothers even outside
of the love, affection, and social approval they receive for having
children. 38 They find motherhood, its promises, and its attendant
37 In embracing a contractual, volitional model of sexual activity, the figure of
the prostitute, for some scholars, has been posited as a means by which women
can reject a maternal role. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 33 at 1058-59; see also
CALIFIA, supra note 6, at 19-20; Aline, Good Girls Go to Heaven, Bad Girls Go
Everywhere, 131-34; Phyllis Luman Metal, One for Ripley's, 119-21 in SEX
WORK: WRITINGS By WOMEN IN THE SEX INDUSTRY (Frederique Delacoste &
Priscilla Alexander eds., 2d ed. 1998). The manner in which a prostitute is
perceived and valued, and how those perceptions relate to perceptions of
women, are other matters altogether, and beyond the scope of this essay.
Compare PATEMAN, supra note 27, at 190-218, with Sylvia A. Law, Commercial
Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73 S. CAL L. REV. 523, 530-42, 586-600
(2000).
38 Perhaps not surprisingly, the amount of social approval one receives often
corresponds with what kind of woman one is. See Lisa Ikemoto, The Code of
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duties attractive and fulfilling, so much so that they would make
considerable sacrifices at any negotiating table to gain them. Often,
the degree to which a woman values motherhood only becomes
visible during divorce proceedings--divorce being that instance not
only when fraught financial and parental negotiation occupy the
same arena, but also when women become aware of the financial
value of the maternal agreements they made while married.39
But what of women who decide not to have children? Into
what negotiations must they enter, and with what risks and what
repercussions? Looking back to the negotiating ideals espoused in
contract law, we know that the process of negotiating any contract
entails the possibility of rejection: that a party at any time may
walk away from the bargaining table either permanently or to gain
better terms. Applying this paradigm to the negotiating process
women face in becoming mothers, we might consider the
mother/contractor (or perhaps "maternal transactor") to be similarly
free, with all attendant risks, to walk away from the prospect of
motherhood by deciding to defer pregnancy or by determining not
to have children at all. Such a negotiating model would appear to
apply most readily to women who choose to abort a pregnancy,
since ideally they have weighed the pros and cons of motherhood
and have rejected its prospects and promises. In such situations
especially, a woman can be perceived as being akin to contract
law's idealized arms-length transactor that empowered agent who,
however profound her maternal feelings, can take or leave a deal
depending on the terms offered.
Yet women who abort, however counterintuitively, reject
precisely these characterizations and views when representing
themselves and their reproductive choices. With a stunning
regularity and sameness, women who have chosen to abort their
pregnancies point not to a revolutionary sense of negotiating power
Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology of Motherhood, the
Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of Law, 53
OHIO ST. L.J. 1205 (1992); McClain, supra note 23.
39 See Silbaugh, supra note 25, at 76-87. For an in-depth proposal for valuing
household labor in the event of divorce, see Martha M. Ertman,
Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women's Work through
Premarital Security Agreements, 72 TEX. L. REv. 17 (1998).
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but to the anxieties, ,personal anguish, and moral quandaries
attending the decision. Furthermore, their testimonies raise other
associated issues. For example, married women who have
abortions after genetic screening often compare themselves
favorably to teenagers who have abortions as a result of
"immature" sexual activity. 41 As such, a number of these women
either describe their decision exclusively within the context of their
desire to be mothers or by utilizing a language of maternal failure--
i.e., that as a mother they are not "good" or self-sacrificing enough
to raise a disabled child. Such lamentations indicate that for some
women there exist children not worth motherhood's selflessness
and sacrifice. In addition, however, they suggest a complex
awareness of the social contradictions attending abortion, issues
arising from the association of female selfishness with maternal
decision-making. Most women therefore explain their decisions to
abort by mourning both the child they would have had and the
selfless ideal of motherhood they would have valued. Both
rhetorically and psychologically, such an approach appears to be
largely successful; women who abort disabled fetuses perceive
themselves (and are perceived) as deserving sympathy. Their line
of argumentation further suggests just how difficult it is for women
to reject the maternal role and the anti-contractual and anti-market
rhetoric that accompanies it.
43
40 BARBARA KATz ROTHMAN, THE TENATIVE PREGNANCY, 200-40 (1994); Joan
Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 16, at 1560; Mark O'Keefe, Abortion Story
Comes out of the Confessional, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, March 12, 1999, at 02F;
see also http://www.naral.org/issues/issues_stories3.html.
41 RAYNA RAPP, TESTING WOMEN, TESTING THE FETUS: THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF
AMNIOCENTESIS IN AMERICA 236-38 (1999).421d. at 136-63, 245-48; ROTHMAN, supra note 40, at 5-11,239-43.
43 These shifts can be seen both in the utilization of anti-market rhetoric by "pro-
life" activists. See FAYE GINSBURG, CONTESTED LIVES: THE ABORTION DEBATE
IN AN AMERICAN COMMUNITY (1998). A similar rejection of the market can also
be seen by the utilization of maternal rhetoric by the pro-choice movement from
moving from "abortion on demand" to "pro-family, pro-child, pro-choice." See
Joan Williams, Gender Wars, supra note 16, at 1592-95. In so stating, I do not
wish to intimate that all women who have abortions somehow want to have
callous, facile views of themselves and their bodies, or that the pro-choice
movement has given up all claim to women asserting control over their
reproductive capacities. Rather, I want to emphasize that it is so difficult for
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Such situations are accompanied by other forms of
contractual reckoning as well, forms that, not surprisingly, differ
across ethnic groups. In a recent study of women contemplating
abortions after amniocentesis, white women usually described their
decisions in terms of selfishness and selflessness. Latina women,
meanwhile, spoke most often about avoiding fetal suffering, while
African-American women most often pointed to the views and
needs of other relatives and the availability of childcare. That
women who face differing pressures and social perceptions would
describe their predicaments differently is perhaps to be expected.
Even more striking, however, is their common perception of
obligation--their shared sense that a vast range of responsibilities
will result from their pregnancies; that these responsibilities are
"female"; and that the duties of motherhood, even in the case of
abortion, cannot be wholly rejected. Even among women who have
chosen to have abortions, the concepts of selfless motherhood and
maternal obligation play a central role in self-definition and self-
perception, even though a range of vocabularies might be used to
delineate what those obligations might be. 44
These prevailing criticisms about women's maternal
selfishness, though, hardly preclude the imposition of a transactor
role being placed upon women's sexual activity. Above nearly all
other things, women are to be rational actors when they have sex,
especially in regard to whether a particular sex act results in
pregnancy. Even women who are presumed to be unthinking and
oversexed are held in line with this transactor ideal-- they engaged
in sex, knowing the consequences, and must be made to pay for
that activity. Regardless of her age and in spite of prevailing
assumptions about sex as a "natural," uninhibited, unlearned, and
hedonistic activity, a woman (or girl) who has sex is presumed to
be a kind of natural contractor, an innately rational transactor fully
women to reject motherhood in any form, even the most self-destructive form
imaginable to a particular woman, that motherhood itself becomes one of the few
acceptable justifications for refusing it.
"See RAPP, supra note 4 1.
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aware of "what she's getting into" by virtue of her essential sexual
agency.45
Yet once she has supposedly negotiated her role as a sexual
actor, a woman must then leave that role behind to become a
mother. It is in this transition from sexual contract to maternal
status, moreover, that the contradictions attending women's
decisions not to have children become most marked. A woman
who aborts may be perceived as an icon of sexual agency, but she
also is seen to be flying in the face of maternal presumptions and
duties, particularly those of endless responsibility and of limited
fertility.' 6 In other words, a woman can perhaps be too pregnant, or
pregnant too often; she cannot, however safely decide never to be
pregnant, but rather only to delay being pregnant in an appropriate
and limited way. Saying no to motherhood, then, is at best a
process of proper deferral--with ensuing punishment if motherhood
is not ultimately accepted, or if the mother herself proves not
ultimately acceptable.
m. On Not Having Children
For many people, choosing not to have children--or even
explaining their uncertainties about having them--is not possible.47
Ideologically speaking, a woman is never entirely infertile, nor can
she choose permanently to be infertile. This is not to say that no
women are infertile--on the contrary--but that women are never
entirely perceived as such. Rather, a woman is seen always as
potentially fertile, or as needing to become fertile. Such
assumptions operate most strikingly in the cases of infertile women
45 See Martha C. Nussbaum, "Whether for Reason or From Prejudice?, Taking
Money for Bodily Services, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 693, 717-18 (1998); GINSBURG &
RAPP, supra note 16, at 147-49; see also FEIN & SCHNEIDER, supra note 6.
46 Calls for personal and sexual responsibility presuppose limited fertility even
when sex is considered a legitimate activity. In an era in which women can be
considered too fertile, the fact that women can control their fertility does not
erase an unspoken premise of limited fertility. See ROTHMAN, supra note 40, at
13.
47 See JANE BARTLETT, WILL You BE MOTHER? WOMEN WHO CHOOSE TO SAY
No xi-xiii (1994); CAROLYN M. MORRELL, UNWOMANLY CONDUCT: THE
CHALLENGE OF INTENTIONAL CHILDLESSNESS xiv-xvi, 2-10 (1994).
208 VOL. IX
MOTHERHOOD AND CONTRACT
who want to have children, since even these women encounter an
emblematic combination of sympathy and thinly disguised anger.
On one hand, they receive copious advice, commentary, and (if
possessing adequate funds) the most advanced medical aid to treat
the malady.48 On the other, they receive a fairly striking
apportionment of blame, particularly in an age in which infertility
has been postulated in the public imagination as an epidemic
experienced by careerist women.49 Selfish in their sexual
transactions or in their decisions to delay marriage and to advance
their careers, infertile women are presumed to be punished for their
selfishness by their infertility. Even amid the omnipresent force of
reproductive technology, their potential for atonement is limited at
best.50 An infertile woman might be able to become pregnant with
the help of such technology, but she is not free of social sanction in
putting herself through such a process. Having presumed to
contract for marriage with a measure of equity, women who have
achieved market success now find themselves told that they are not
only inferior women (unable to be mothers) but also would be
inferior mothers, since the same selfishness that has produced their
infertility would, in turn, produce potentially inferior offspring.
51
As might be expected, this same brew of advice and
animosity, with even greater potency, greets a woman who does
not want to have children. Choosing to question what is above
question, this woman may be said to occupy a more radical
48 See ELAINE TYLER MAY, BARREN IN THE PROMISED LAND: CHILDLESS
AMERICANS AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 231-41 (1995).
49 See MARGARET MARCH & WANDA RONNER, THE EMPTY CRADLE:
INFERTILITY IN AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 244-47, 254-
55 (1996); MAY, supra note 48, at 213-17. In some ways, this phenomenon is
not all that new: women have been at other times that too much education would
render them infertile or insane. See, e.g., GRANT, supra note 3, at 212-13.
50 The publicity surrounding infertility and reproductive technology indicates,
among other things, that children are the ultimate entitlement and marker of
success, and that failure is not without its costs, emotional as well as monetary.
See MAY, supra note 48; see also Carol Sanger, M is for the Many Things, 15 S.
CAL REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD., 15, 53 (1992).
51 See MAY, supra note 48, at 217-23: see also DIANA RAAB, GETrING
PREGNANT AND STAYING PREGNANT: OVERCOMING FERTILITY AND MANAGING
YOUR HIGH-RISK PREGNANCY (1991); GALE A. SLOAN, POSTPONING
PARENTHOOD: THE EFFECT OF AGE ON REPRODUCTIVE POTENTIAL (1993).
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position than the selfish aborter, who may still recuperate her
abortion via deferred, "chosen" motherhood. Unlike the selfish
infertile woman, she is also beyond atonement, since she suffers
neither from her inability to have a child nor from painful fertility
treatments. If married, she moves entirely beyond the pale, since
she cannot even function (like unhappily unmarried and childless
heterosexual women) as an object of pity.52 Possessing no such
means of self-justification or self-abnegation, she becomes an
affront to marriage itself, since her rejection of the maternal role
becomes an attempt to elude the terms under which she entered the
contract and status of marriage in the first place.
53
These negative judgments regarding women who do not
have children, moreover, are not confined exclusively to men.
Women who decide not to become mothers can provoke anger in
other women, who sense a value judgment of their own choices
and the duties that have come with them.54 In addition, women
52 MAY, supra note 48, at 182-99; see also SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH 3-46, 82-
111 (1991).
33 Women who decide not to have children are told repeatedly that they will
regret their decision or are warned they will be seized with relentless maternal
longings. Childless women, if they are married, also find that their marriage will
not be treated as a "real" marriage without children. See MORELL, supra note 47,
MAY, supra note 48, at 131-32; ELAINE CAMPBELL, THE CHILDLESS MARRIAGE -
- AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF COUPLES WHO Do NOT WANT CHILDREN 94-113
(1985); see also MAUREEN MILLER, DOUBLE INCOME, No KIDS... YET: How
TO RESOLVE THE MOTHERHOOD/CAREER DILEMMA AND HAVE IT ALL 20 (1989).
("Even though you may be confident about your negative views on children now,
it is important to be at least aware of the way the desire to be a mother may creep
up on you unexpectedly, releasing emotions and psychological pressures which
will surprise you by their power.") Ironically enough, intentionally childless
women also sometimes receive criticism for not deciding to "balance" work in
the market and motherhood, and their decision is denigrated for having been
made without first-hand knowledge of childrearing -- which would moot the
childlessness problem. These criticisms, however, also insinuate that the only
true knowledge of mothering is available to women who parent their "own"
children. See KATHLEEN GERSON, HARD CHOICES: How WOMEN DECIDE ABOUT
WORK, CAREER, AND MOTHERHOOD 140-53 (University of California Press
1985); see also GRANT, supra note 3, at viii-ix.
54 Ironically, for women who do have children and who are middle class, a
decision to stay at home and mother is defended in part on the grounds that
doing so is a "career," whereas women who are not middle class do not have a
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who do not have children are viewed as unthinking and unfeeling
towards women who do. Apparently unable to imagine the burdens
associated with having children, theyZ are perceived as less
emotionally and spiritually evolved. Yet ironically, these
supposed incapacities of childless women in no way free them
from domestic and maternal responsibilities. Indeed, these are
women who are pressed into becoming caretakers of other family
members and other women's children.56 Thus, even while she is
considered less worthy because she is not a mother, the childless
woman nonetheless finds herself assuming her "share" of maternal
and familial responsibilities, since, by virtue of her being a woman,
she must utilize her time doing the work that mothers do.
As with the criticisms faced by women who have abortions,
those faced by women who choose not to have children differ
depending on age and group identification. A white and middle
class woman, for example, might be blamed for helping to create
differential rates of reproduction among racial groups. In such a
situation, she is told she is the kind of woman who is entitled to be
a mother, who should be a mother, and who will be, by shirking
her maternal duty, causing harm to social stability and progress. By
contrast, a woman who belongs to a minority group or who is
"career" when they are in the home, perhaps because their work does not deserve
such a title. This particular dichotomy has resurfaced as of late in the popular
press, but also was noticeable in the debate over welfare reform. See ANN
CRITrENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN
THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED 87-109, 236-74 (2001); CHRISTINA
BAGVLI TINGLOF, THE STAY AT HOME PARENT SURVIVAL GUIDE: REAL LIFE
ADVICE FROM MOMS, DADS, AND OTHER EXPERTS 1-6, 62-79, 147-52, 234-240
(2000); WILLIAMS, ROOSTER'S EGG supra note 19.
55 See BARTLETT, supra note 47; MORRELL, supra note 47.
36 In keeping with the charged atmosphere surrounding maternal labor or
"motherwork," these obligations receive a variety of responses from women
themselves. See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT:
KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT, 42-47,
122-123 (Unwin Hyman, Inc. ed., 1990); MORELL, supra note 47, at 117-150;
Barbara Katz Rothman, Beyond Mothers and Fathers: Ideology in a Patriarchal
Society, in MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE AND AGENCY 155-56 (1994);
Carol B. Stack & Linda M. Burton, Kinscripts: Reflections on Family,
Generation, and Culture, in MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE AND AGENCY
31-42 (Routledge ed., 1994).
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working class faces censure for having too many children or for
simply having them at the wrong time. While such criticisms are
fueled in part by a desire to reduce reproduction in stigmatized
groups, they are also driven by equally powerful assumptions about
fertility and sexual agency, particularly in regard to minority
women. 57 The result is an almost untenable set of contradictions,
since minority women face both the larger societal prejudice that
they should not reproduce even as they are assumed to be incapable
of managing their own fecundity.5 8 A woman of a minority group
deciding not to have children altogether, then, is apparently
unthinkable. Put another way, where legislative and popular views
of personal and sexual responsibility demand fertility be selective,
women neither can become too fertile nor decide for all time not to
be fertile.
IV. On Having Other People's Children
Given the pervasiveness with which concepts of contract
are inscribed into ideas of legitimate motherhood and sexual
activity, we might expect reproductive agreements that rely upon
legal contracts to be greeted with either relief or indifference. A
culture that already idealizes sex, marriage, and reproduction as the
57 These assumptions have been put into practice via sterilization abuse, either
through forced sterilization regimes in the United States for the "feeble minded,"
or through sterilization of women of color without their consent. See MAY, supra
note 48, at 95-125; see also DANIEL KEvLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS:
GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY 96-112 (1985).
58 This presumption of rampant fertility is perhaps most telling for African
American women, who have been stigmatized as being always available for sex
and reproduction, or for reproducing too often and irresponsibly. See McClain,
supra note 23 at 340. Yet an African American woman deciding not to have
children altogether would not be behaving as her overly fertile self, nor, from
another vantage point, would she be a woman resisting racism by having
children. See COLIUNS, supra note 56 at 122; Roberts, Housework, supra note
15, at 68-70. And where a prevailing viewpoint is that African American women
are unable to refuse sex, it is not difficult to understand how a woman may not
be seen to possess the power to refuse reproduction. Similar concerns present
themselves with Latina or Native American women, who have also been subject
to sterilization abuse by doctors. See MAY, supra note 48 at 191-94; see
PATRICIA WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 217-19.
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products of mutual agreement between equals might well embrace
contract as a tool to formalize such agreements. As the
controversies surrounding surrogacy and adoption contracts
demonstrate, however, contracting for motherhood--or for the
duties that traditionally accompany it-- usually produces the
opposite cultural response.
Nowhere is the ideological gap between bearing another's
child and bearing one's own child more apparent than in the
controversies surrounding surrogacy. Calling surrogacy, aptly
enough, "contract motherhood," a number of scholars have
expressed concern over the fairness of the legal agreements
attending it.59 Often compellingly, they have questioned the
capacity of women to make such contracts, citing the disparities in
bargaining power that exist between women who are surrogates
and the couples who contract with them.60 Such disparities, in
59 See, e.g., Leslie Bender, Teaching Feminist Perspectives on Health Care &
Law: A Review Essay, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1251, 1269-70 (1993) (summarizing
different approaches); Joan C. Callahan & Dorothy E. Roberts, A Feminist
Social Justice Approach to Reproduction-Assisting Technologies: A Case Study
on the Limits of Legal Theory, 84 Ky. L.J. 1197 (1996); Dorothy E. Roberts,
The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 209, 273 (1995); Sherylynn Fiandaca,
Comment: In Vitro Fertilization and Embryos: The Need for International
Guidelines, 8 ALB. L. J. Sc. & TECH. 337, 366 (1998). For a discussion of
racial issues and ideas of genetic ownership, see Roberts, Genetic Tie, supra at
209-13; Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J.
935 (1996) (discussing racial differences in the manner in which one values one's
own genetic legacy and the surrogacy question in general). For a good
discussion of different doctrinal approaches to surrogacy and proposed solutions
to the problems it poses, see Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A
Legal Framework for Surrogate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343 (1995).
60 See PATEMAN, supra note 27, at 210-13. There is a small library of
scholarship on the question of surrogacy and new reproductive technologies.
See, e.g., Kyle C. Velte, Egging on Lesbian Maternity: The Legal Implications
of Tri-Gametic In-Vitro Fertilization, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOc. L. & PoL'Y 431
(1999); Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Defining Motherhood
in the Era of Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CARDoZO L. REV. 497 (1996);
Judith F. Darr, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pregnancy Process:
Developing an Equality Model to Protect Reproductive Liberties, 25 AM. J. L.
& MED. 455 (1999); Judith F. Darr, Regulating Reproductive Technologies:
Panacea or Paper Tiger?, 34 Hous. L. REv. 609 (1997); Martha Field,
Surrogacy Contracts--Gestational and Traditional: The Argument for
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more radical critiques, have led commentators even to compare the
situations of surrogate transactors to those of prostitutes.
61
Given that surrogacy appears to be more often discussed
and debated than practiced, surrogacy itself exposes anxieties over
any connection between contract and motherhood. I find the
relentless debate over surrogacy interesting in part because it
serves as an indicator of the anxieties people feel over motherhood,
both as an entitlement that women have and as a practice in which
they must engage. While expressing valid and, indeed, vital
concerns about exploitation and commodification, critiques of
surrogacy nevertheless often ignore the troubling contractual
aspects inherent in "real" motherhood itself. Most frequently, they
presume that mothers perform their labor (reproductive and
otherwise) for free, and, in so doing, achieve their due measure of
legal and social legitimacy. This presumption is understandable
and perhaps unavoidable, yet it relies upon an inference that
deserves interrogation. Critiques of surrogacy contracts may claim
that such contracts change the function of a woman's uterus from
Nonenforcement, 31 WASH. L. J. I (1991); Marsha Garrison, Law Making for
Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal
Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835 (2000); E. Ann Kaplan, The Politics of
Surrogacy Narratives, in FEMINISM, MEDIA, & THE LAW 193-202 (Martha A.
Fineman & Martha T. McCluskey, eds.) (1997); JOHN A. ROBERTSON,
CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
(1994); Kermit Roosevelt III, The Newest Property: Reproductive Technologies
and the Concept of Parenthood, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79 (1998); Alan
Wertheimer, Exploitation and Commercial Surrogacy, 74 DENY. U. L. REV.
1215 (1997); Mary Lynne Birck, Comment, Modern Reproductive Technology
and Motherhood: The Search for Common Ground and the Recognition of
Difference, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1623 (1994); Denise E. Lascarides, Note, A Plea
for the Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1221 (1997). Similar questions have presented themselves in the area of egg
donation for infertile couples. See, e.g., Katheryn D. Katz, Ghost Mothers:
Human Egg Donation and the Legacy of the Past, 57 ALB. L. REV. 733 (1994);
Ann Reichman Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation: Unscrambling the
Conundrum of Legal Maternity, 80 IOWA L. REv. 265 (1995).
61 See Corea, supra note 17, at 38-39, 44-45; see PATEMAN, supra note 27, at
212-13; ANDREA DWORKIN, RIGHT WING WOMEN 181-88 (1983). Other studies
have linked prostitution and surrogacy as forms of commodification of women,
without necessarily stating their equivalence. See, e.g., RADIN, supra, note 10, at
131-53.
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"motherhood" to that of "service," but the fact that women have
contracted to provide such a service does not mean that women
have necessarily not contracted for motherhood either. As I have
demonstrated in the first two sections of this essay, the marriage
contract is accompanied by a series of other intimate contracts--
over sexual activity, pregnancy, childbirth, and child-rearing--that
are as culturally pervasive as they are binding. The responsibilities
bestowed by such agreements, for most women, constitute the
duties of "real" motherhood, which are further sanctified by the
selflessness definitive of that status.
Real mothers are not paid for their labor, then, not because
it is valueless but because it is supposedly priceless. Yet, when that
labor is contracted out to others--as it is every day to nannies,
daycare workers, and domestic laborers--it becomes transformed
into low-paid (and often unskilled) work. It is a transformation
worth considering, especially for the ways in which it allows us to
locate, with precision, the source of laboring mothers' "real,"
inestimable value. Maternal labor, however it may be priced on the
open market when done by others, apparently increases
exponentially in (ideological) worth when done by the mother
herself.62 This radical compounding of value can be said to
underwrite the bulk of the demands that face women when they
enter into the marriage contract. Given the high value of such work
when done by wives and mothers, it is assumed that women
entering marriage will of course avail themselves of the
opportunity to maximize their own worth. As might be expected,
women who contract to have their labor done for them face
questions and criticisms similar to those attending any act of
outsourcing. Considering the magnitude of difference existing
between the value of her own labor and that of the person she pays,
it is difficult for her to defend such a cheapening of her duties even
if her own labor proves more profitable in the marketplace than in
the home.
That such assumptions inform even radical feminist
critiques of surrogacy is a testimony to their pervasiveness and
power. Arguing that surrogacy is inherently harmful, theorists like
62 See Roberts, Housework, supra note 15; Silbaugh, supra note 25.
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Carol Pateman presume the move from motherhood to surrogacy to
be one of desecration. Their representation of surrogacy as just
another contract for service, however, does not adequately describe
the cultural forces at work within it--forces that only become
apparent when the surrogacy contract goes awry.63 Simply put,
were surrogacy merely a contract for service, a surrogate refusing
to give up a baby would have no legal case in court. Paid to nurture
a fetus and perhaps to provide half of its genetic material, the
surrogate in a strict contractual scenario has negotiated to exchange
her parental right to that fetus for a fixed sum. That courts have
found surrogacy cases more complex than other kinds of contract
disputes suggests that surrogacy agreements obviously involve
more than just a contract for service. What is being bought is not
the ability to bear children but motherhood itself. Such a purchase
involves much more than simply acquiring the right to claim a
child as one's own. With it one also acquires the full cultural heft
of motherhood: the right to claim maternal status with all its
accompanying privileges and duties; and the right to value that
status and those duties as priceless.
Where surrogacy contracts have come under dispute, the
surrogate's ability to claim this status of motherhood usually
comprises the strongest part of her case. Here, she argues that her
own ignorance of the value of motherhood must render the contract
void; having contracted to provide a "service," she discovers that
63 While Pateman states that the surrogate mother is selling herself in a more
fundamental way than the prostitute is, she also claims that the surrogacy
contract itself "reveals little about the institution of marriage, prostitution, or
'surrogate' motherhood. The surrogacy contract is another means by which
patriarchal subordination is secured." PATEMAN, supra note 27, at 215. I would
argue that the surrogacy contract, whether it is breached or honored, reveals a
great deal about how these particular institutions are valued within the legal
system and within a broader social context. What I have found striking in the
context of surrogacy cases is that a woman who has (depending on whom we
believe) sold her body has been found to have some sort of a claim at all, even if
that claim may not prove successful. I think the fact that these cases even make it
into court indicates the way, in which the status of motherhood is difficult to
ignore, even if the fact of that recognition is insufficient to prove that woman's
case. For perhaps the paradigmatic, if not inescapable, examples in law and
scholarship on surrogacy, see Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); In
re BabyM, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
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she is in fact imbued with the full status of motherhood. When
considering such cases, therefore, courts must determine what
constitutes parentage, and confront this question by weighing the
competing claims of the ownership of genetic material, the acts of
carrying and giving birth to a child, and the best interests of the
child produced.
At least two inferences can be made from the cases and
commentary surrounding surrogacy. Most immediately, both
suggest that "real" motherhood is as much a matter of property and
ownership as of embodied experience. More broadly, they make
plain that unreal mothers--those unable to claim both genetic tie
and embodied experience--have a much more difficult time
attaining the status of motherhood. Or, put another way, "real
mothers" are the women most likely to retain their high moral
status if forced to contract to have some of their duties done by
other women.
64
The question of surrogacy becomes further complicated by
the possibility of adoption, often posited as an acceptable and less
exploitative alternative to surrogacy.65 (While the politics of
adoption themselves also have raised considerable debate,6
adoptive couples are rarely if ever criticized for not using a
surrogate.) 67 Women trying to become adoptive parents, however,
64See, e.g., Linda Lacey, 0 Wind, Remind Him I Have No Child: Infertility and
Feminist Jurisprudence, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & LAW 163 (1998); Roberts,
Housework, supra note 15, at 56-63.
0 See, e.g., Field, supra note 17, at 6-11 (claiming that the surrogacy market
may harm the adoption "market" and lessen the likelihood of adoption of
children with disabilities).
66 See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appelton, "Planned Parenthood": Adoption, Assisted
Reproduction, and the New Ideal Family, I WASH. U. J. L. & POL 85 (1999);
Elizabeth Bartholet, Beyond Biology: The Politics of Adoption and
Reproduction, 2 DUKE GENDER J. L. & POL'Y 5 (1995); Hawley Fogg-Davis, A
Race-Conscious Argument for Transracial Adoption, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 385
(1997); Jacinda T. Townsend, Reclaiming Self-Determination: A Call for
Intraracial Adoption, 2 DUKE GENDER J. L. & POL'Y 173 (1995); Comment, The
Best Interests of the Child: Eliminating Discrimination in the Screening of
Adoptive Parents, 27 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 167 (1997).
67 The opposite, however, is far from the case; in the face of exploding world
population and with so many children not having "good" homes, the decision to
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sometimes find themselves criticized for commodifying babies or
confronted with the task of conforming to adoption agencies'
highly restrictive notions of what a "mother" should be. 68 They also
confront many of the same cultural assumptions that come with
contracting with a surrogate. Sympathy for the birth mother and
suspicion of the adoptive mother are implicit in the transaction,
69
and evaporate only when the child to be adopted is somehow
disabled, damaged, or otherwise (economically or literally)
abandoned. In such cases, maternal selflessness and self-sacrifice--
mothering a child no real mother would want--lets a maternal
transactor off the contractual hook. Where the selflessness of the
mother has the power to remove the taint of contract, one can
safely adopt children only who have been refused by their "real"
mothers.
If adoption contracts have gained more rapid social
acceptance than surrogacy contracts, part of this relative ease stems
from the degree to which the pregnant female body figures in each
transaction. When she "gives" her child up for adoption or places it
on what has been called the "grey" adoption market, her pregnant
use a surrogate rather than to adopt is to be selfish once again, justifiably or not.
See, e.g., Lacey, supra note 64, at 175-80.
6 See RAPP, supra note 41; Lacey, supra note 64, at 164. What is not often
questioned, however, is what is being expected of women who might potentially
adopt or contract with a surrogate, or how they are being perceived as a result of
their negotiations. Given the inequities that often result in a woman's giving up a
baby, it is difficult to separate that situation from other forms of exploitation,
unless we are willing to accept the fact that some of the women involved do not
want to be mothers. See, e.g., Lacey, supra note 64; Sanger, supra note 20, at
490-99.
69 Conversely, women who do not give up their babies for adoption are
considered to be selfish for not giving babies (or transacting for them) with
women and men who do want them. Particularly for unmarried white women,
this particular experience of anger and recrimination occurs because they are not
providing a needed commodity to women who want and deserve to be mothers.
It is therefore that women are walking away from a particular agreement that is
supposed to further their prospects and expectations, such as giving up their
white baby to a white family, so that they may pursue, perhaps, market-based
success or more appropriate motherhood. See, e.g. Martha C. Ward, Early
Childbearing: What is the Problem and Who Owns it? in GINSBURG & RAPP,
supra note 16, at 142-56.
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body is less central to the transaction than that of the surrogate
mother.70 Her body, after all, has not been controlled during the
course of the transaction. A woman contracting to adopt a child,
therefore, finds herself involved in a less debased negotiation than
when she contracts with a surrogate. Whereas the centrality of the
latter's pregnant body (and its attendant claims) make this
transactor's "right" to the child more tenuous, she can contract for
motherhood in an adoptive context without any form of "mother"
present.
71
Such distinctions suggest more about the prevailing
anxieties attending women's bodies than about the exploitation of
women's bodily integrity. But most striking in commentaries on
adoption and surrogacy--and many can be found--is the
predominance of statements about the fragility of motherhood and
the potential for debasing it. Within these discussions, motherhood
stands as a transcendent construct, ahistorical, monolithic, and
impervious to cultural change. While such notions may be useful in
the heat of a litigation battle, they become roadblocks to
understanding why some pregnancies are real and others are not.
Looking to the history of motherhood and the contractors
surrounding it, from wet-nurses to governesses, we find neither
consistency nor stasis in dominant notions of mother or child.
72
The fact that other women have contracted for motherhood (and
have done so across centuries and national boundaries) does not
70 See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 60, at 860-65 (discussing adoption "market"
and repercussions).
71 Granted, at this point in time, we can postulate a variety of approaches to
adoption, including open adoption, but I am interested in the way in which the
"birth mother's" body can be under erasure in the context of an adoption, such
that the adopted baby itself is postulated as a gift, or, at least that the child is not
as actively "bought" as in a surrogacy situation. See Sanger, supra note 20, at
490-99 (discussing this conflict); Lucy S. McGough & Annette Peitier-
Falahahwazl, Secrets & Lies: A Model Statute for Cooperative Adoption, 60 LA.
L. REV. 13 (1999); but see MAGGIE AND LINDA KIRKMAN, MY SISTER'S CHILD
(1983) (depicting sisters' surrogacy agreement and advocating for gift
surrogacy).
72 See DAVIDOFF & HALL, supra note 8, at 353-41; ALAN RICHARDSON,
LITERATURE, EDUCATION, & ROMANTICISM: READING As SOCIAL PRACTICE
1780-1832, 25-40, 167-252; (1994); Sanger, supra note 20 at 391-409.
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mean, of course, that surrogacy is somehow free of exploitation.
However, bearing in mind how other women have contracted for
motherhood promises to make our discussions of surrogacy and
adoption more nuanced--particularly in explaining how the issues
attending the ideological desire for selective reproduction
transform so quickly into questions concerning the morality of a
market-based approach to reproduction. In the final section of this
essay, I take up this issue of the market, and explore what happens
when motherhood itself is commodified, and mothers, perhaps not
surprisingly, come cheap.
V. Bad Mothers as Transactors
Much as a woman who chooses not to have children
occupies an irredeemable position within reproductive ideologies, a
mother either unable or unwilling to be selfless is perhaps the
greatest affront to motherhood of all. This woman is unable to
meet social standards of care for her children or else harms them
by commission or omission. 73 Even in the course of examining
motherhood as a positive experience for women--one that can be
unique, fulfilling, and indeed worthy of celebration--the figure of
the bad mother stands as an ever-present attendant on that
experience. Bad mothers (depending on whom you ask) are
abusive and neglectful, surrogate and adoptive. They work because
they can't stand to stay at home and they stay at home because they
can't stand to work. As signs of moral decay, such women embody
selfishness and insane autonomy. The bad mother is a useful
device; she stands as a model of self-reproach and as a means of
policing other mothers. She also is a marvelous assurance for one's
own behavior. Through her women must confront themselves as
73 See Marie Ashe, "Bad Mothers" and Welfare Reform in Massachusetts: The
Case of Claribel Ventura, in FEMINISM, MEDIA, & THE LAW 203-16 (1998);
Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse, a Problem for Feminist Theory, 2
TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 75-76 (1993).
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mothers and as women who at some point might wish to abandon
motherhood itself.
74
Her specter perhaps looms largest over the issue of
childcare, and registers most distinctly where child care workers
harm or kill their charges. In such cases, the mother of the child
will find herself criticized for leaving her child or exposing that
child to harm. The fact that children are more likely to come to
harm at the hands of parents and relatives than under the care of a
stranger is beside the point; what is condemned is her decision to
walk away from the child.75 Such criticisms are particularly
strident in the case of mothers who do not "have" to work. Women
who separate from their children on the basis of economic
necessity can at least claim to prefer the home to the marketplace.
These processes of differentiation and self-determination reveal the
associated beliefs that what is best for children' is a mother's
continual presence, and that anything less will harm them.76 The
fact that attacks on women in the market have been most virulent
towards elite women--those most able to contract and most able, in
a sense, to submit to the private subsidy of mothering--indicates
74 See HOCHSCHILD, TIME BIND supra note 12, at 224-39. For a dramatic
evocation of these possibilities, see ANDREA PEYSER, MOTHER LOVE, DEADLY
LOVE: THE SUSAN SMITH MURDERS (1995).
75 The hostility directed toward Deborah Eappen during the Louise Woodward
trial is a case in point. See, e.g., Christy Bacque, Babies Need Their Own
Mothers, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Nov. 26, 1997, at A16; David Sapsted, Hate Mail
for Eappens as au Pair Awaits Fate, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 10, 1997, at 7; Ed
Hayward, Backers of Nanny, Eappens, Wage War on Web, BOSTON HERALD,
March 9, 1998, at 1; Ed Vuillamy & Mark Tran, Lifestyle of a 'Yuppie' Put to
Trial: British nanny Louise Woodward May not be the Defendant in the Boston
Baby Trial, THE OBSERVER, Oct, 19, 1997, at 19; see generally Ashe & Cahn,
supra note 73.
76 These criticisms do not apply for all mothers. Women who stay at home with
their children while on public assistance face considerable revilement of all by
virtue of their social status. See FOLBRE, supra note 10, at 117-20, 200-04
(comparing numbers of women on AFDC with women receiving private subsidy
from husbands); WILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER'S EGG, supra note 19. This
approach, oddly enough, contrasts with other forms of blaming of mothers
(particularly overbearing and omnipresent mothers) for disabilities and mental
illness. See GRANT, supra note 3; MILLER, supra note 3; RICHARD POLLAK, THE
CREATION OF DR. B: A BIOGRAPHY OF BRUNO BETTELHEIM (1998).
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that the prospect of a mother outside of the home becomes most
threatening when she does not have to be there for her own
economic survival. She is most likely not to care, to be a bad
mother abandoning her duty of selflessness, when seduced by her
own market power.
7 7
Even in cases where all of the maternal labor in a
household is contracted to outside laborers, the contractual
relationships that result are nevertheless gendered. The manner in
which women perceive the relationship between themselves and
the caretaker indicates that they view this work as "their"
responsibility. In terms of who interviews and takes care of the
logistics of childcare, women do the bulk of this work. Married
women who are mothers, moreover, often consider that their
salaries (not their husbands') pay for domestic assistance,
suggesting that even their transacting market-based selves assume
responsibility for childrearing and domestic labor. The model
produced here is one of mother as reduced market actor and as
potentially bad mother, regulating and providing for the private
sphere and having, at best, limited involvement in the public
sphere.
The contradictory status of the maternal transactor is further
supported by the fact that the most frequent maternal contracts are
those least likely to be acknowledged as such. Our unwillingness to
associate motherhood with nannying and other forms of childcare
7 Mothers in the market, however, do not necessarily fare all that much better.
Contrasted with these visions of the bad mother is the bad worker who lets her
personal commitments get in the way of her experience in the market. In such a
way, the 'strength' that has been expected by mothers, indeed superhuman
strength, has been co-opted into a particular model of the ideal employee who
can "balance" a variety of commitments without letting her employer down. See
JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 8 (discussing "ideal worker"
problem); see also AASTA S. LUBIN, MANAGING SUCCESS: HIGH-ECHELON
CAREERS AND MOTHERHOOD (1987). Women in support staff or factory
positions encounter similar tensions, with a smaller margin of economic safety.
See, e.g., EILEEN BORIS, HOME To WORK: MOTHERHOOD AND THE POLITICS OF
INDUSTRIAL HOMEWORK IN THE UNITED STATES (1994); HOCHSCHILD, TIME
BIND, supra note 12, at 143-73; see also Melissa A Childs, Comment, The
Changing Face of Unions: What Women Want From Employers, 12 DEPAUL
BUS. L.J. 381 (1999/2000).
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confirms the idea that real motherhood and contracted childcare are
an ideological contradiction in terms. Their real wages being of
low value, furthermore, preserves the idea of real motherhood as
occupying a space outside of the market.7 8 For these reasons,
attempting to value maternal labor is often derided (derived?) as
offensive or impossible, since the affection and satisfaction women
receive from it makes it of such high value that doing so becomes
useless. Still, women's experiences of doing unpaid labor in the
private sphere indicate other forces at work. Women customarily
spend their time away from work on domestic care. Men,
primarily, do not. Where "leisure time" away from work is
supposed to be a means by which people recover from their work
day and find rejuvenation in rest and recreation, women may be so
overworked that they cannot take advantage of the benefits that the
private sphere can offer.79 Instead, women occupy their hours of
leisure with work that is "theirs"--"theirs" as duties to be assumed
rather than as obligations to be rewarded.
As such, we must conclude that maternal labor receives
sentimental rather than economic value, and that maternal
transactions are always attended by some kind of flaw or failure.
As she negotiates her way between the public and private sphere,
the maternal transactor is reminded constantly that other people's
care can never be as good as hers, and that every moment spent in
the marketplace harms her children. Whether transacting to have
work done for her or contracting to do work for another, she is
reminded again and again that the experience of transacting harms
all the parties involved by alienating caretaking from its
supposedly "natural" and biological mores and moving it to a form
of low-level economic exploitation. Once she does so, she is told
that the labor is no longer "special" because it is no longer
provided by a particular kind of mother; it may be compensable,
but it will never be priceless. The responsibility is hers in the
contracting. The experience is hers for the contracting. And in all
events she will end up a bad mother, once her negotiations begin.
78 See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 8; Roberts, Housework,
supra note 15.
79 See HOCHSCHILD, SECOND SHIFT, supra note 13, at 2-10, 27-28, 37-40.
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Part of my insistence in this essay on re-imagining
marriage, pregnancy, and child-rearing through the language of
contract, then, has arisen out of my desire to demonstrate the
usefulness of contract as an analytical paradigm to feminists to
demonstrate the ways in which women encounter motherhood and
the costs they incur as they attempt to negotiate their relationship
with that institution. In the process, however, I hope that I also
have demonstrated the ways in which all of these topics are
presided over simultaneously (and contradictorily) by ideas of
contract and status. While recognizing the transactions mothers
enter, we must also recognize the ways in which women, through
motherhood, have been given an offer that they cannot refuse. Both
motherhood and contract are surprisingly fluid, so much so that an
overly rigid formulation of choice is neither useful nor realistic. If
motherhood is a status, and a status that cannot be refused in its
entirety, then the ways in which mothers are allowed to transact
offer up other insights that demonstrate the threat that even these
limited negotiations present to prevailing ideals of both
motherhood and contract.
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